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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH SAVING & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
vs.

No. 9159

ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al.
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO.
Defendant and Appellant.

SECOND REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LUDLOW
PLUMBING SUPPLY CO.
Not only does loaning institutions and title insurance
companies rely upon decisions of this Honorable Court in
Mechanic's Lien cases, in financing construction and insuring
titles to real properties in the state of Utah, but mechanics
and materialmen also rely on the same decisions in furnishing labor and materials for construction work.
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This court has construed the lien laws of this state in
the many cases cited and relied upon by appellant. There appears to be but little factual difference in the instant case
and in the United States Building & Loan v:-~. Midvale case
quoted from in appellant's original brief. In the Building &
Loan case there were numerous owners, purchasers under
contract, and the lots liened and owned by the contract purchasers were not all contiguous but some were separated by
lots of other owners not represented in the action. The
same objection was urged there as is urged by respondent
in this case. The same principal of la '" was applied in the
U.S. Building & Loan case as was applied in the early case of
Garner v Van Patten, 20 U. 342 and in the Eccles Lumber
Co .v Martin case, cited in appellant'~ original brief.
In the above three mentioned case~ thi~ court particularly construed Sec. 38-1-8 UCA 1953 which section i~ ~o heavily
relied upon by respondent. The court held that under our
lien laws one is not limited to the filing of a lien on two
or more properties only if they are contiguous \vhere more
than one structure i:-~ involved. Neither ha:-~ thi~ court held
that title to the properties liened n1 u:-~t be in one O\nler \rhere
building is by one contractor and n1aterial~ are furnished
under one contract.
It is to be noted that ~ection 38-1-8 UCA 1953 i~ identical with Sec. 1387 R.S. 1898, and C.L. 1907, Sec. 1387; C.L.
1917, Sec. 3737; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, Sec. 52-1-8, and the
above mentioned cases having been decided after the enactment of the~e laws, our legi~lature has adopted the
judicial construction given to section 38-1-8 UCA 1953 in
thos~ decisions.
See Sta mn1 Elec. Co. v Ha1niltonBrown
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Shoe Co. (lVIo.) 165 S.W. 2d 437, 4~1.1, and Drake Lumber
\·. Paget, (Or.) 27 '1 P2d 804.
Respondent insists on singling out and relying upon but
one section of our lien statute Section 38-1-8 and completely
ignores section 38-1-3 giving materialmen a lien upon the
property for which they furnish materials, and section 38-14 making two or more lots or subdivisions one for the purpose of the lien law. Neither one of those sections contain
the words "provided the properties are in the name of one
owner.
~,

In the Eccle~ Lumber case the court said one cannot
~ingle out or segregate a section or a part of a chapter and get
the meaning or intent in the following words of Justice Frick:
··In order to arrive at the true legislative intent,
courts cannot segregate a section or a part of an entire chapter upon a given subject, and from such
part alone determine the true meaning or intent of
the \vhole. \Ioreover, the object or purpose of the
la·w a~ a w!lole tnu:--t Le con~idered. "'
In the same case, Justice Frick makes an interesting
analysis of section 1386, which is now Section 38-1-7 UCA
1953 and section 1387 which is identical with section 38-1-8
\vherein the same question was raised as is raised by respondent in the instant case, that the claimant failed to state
the amount due on each building liened. Justice Frick
further said:
"the lien is complete by complying with section
1386. The statement of the amount due on each building separately, as provided in section 1387, would
be but a restatement of the amount of the claim as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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required by section 1386, in another form. As we
view it, this restatement was not intended as an essential part in acquiring the lien. It could subserve no
purpose to attain that end. It could in no way affect
the amount claimed against the entire property. A
discrimination must be made between the things that
are necessary to acquire a lien and those that are
merely intended to protect the interests of the lien
claimants between or among themselves. The statements in section 1387, as we view it, clearly belong
to the latter class. The statements of the claimant
provided for in section 1387 are made sufficient to
acquire a lien and to protect the o'rner of the property. To hold that a restatement of the amount of the
claim in another form i~ likewise neces~ary to acquire a lien, unless the statute require~ this to be
done in terms, is adding, by constrncti'"ln, an es:-'ential not required by the ~tatute."
Section 38-1-7 requires the name of the o"1.1er to be
given, provided the name of the owner i~ known to the lien
claimant. It is evident that the legislature did not consider
the name of the owner important. As was held in the Golden
Belt Lumber case, ( Kan.) 26 P2d 27 4, it is the delivery
of materials under a single contract ,,-hich determine the
question whether several lots are ~ubject to a lien and not
the location of the lots or the 1natter of o'rnership, and the
lots need not be contiguous. It appears by the Eccles and
U. S. Bldg. & Loan rases the provi~ion~ of the statute is
met if the "·ork is done hy the ~an1e person and we think
this is the same construction placed on the cases found in 10
ALR and 75 ALR relied upon by respondent in it's petition
and brief for re-hearing at page 5. Both of these references
appear in annotation to ~eetion 38-l-8 UCA 1953.
Respondent says at page 5 of it's brief that in none of
the cases annotated in the t"·o ALR Yohune~ above referred
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lo~

and in no casP- cited by appellant Ludlow, or which respondent has been able to discover, has a single blanket lien
covering property owned in severalty, in the face of an unambiguous statute prohibiting the same, been allowed. It
appears that respondent has misconstructed the decisions
handed down by this court in the Garner, Eccles, and U. S.
Bldg. & Loan cases and in the Colorado case of Branan Sand
& Gravel quoted from in appellant's original brief at pages
22 and 23.
In the cases annotated in 10 and 7 5 ALR relied on by
respondent the property affected was not in one owner, it
appears this was not considered necessary.
In the Golden Belt Lb. case cited at pages 28 and 33 of
appellant's original brief, there the court at page 276 quotes
from Stoltze v Hurd, 29 N.D. 412, 128 N.W. 115, 30 LRA
(N.S.) 1219, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 871 as follows:
·It was held that where 2 persons owning adjoining
lots tnade a single contract for the erection of a building thereon, the lien must follow the contract, and a
person who ~u pplied materials for the building under
a single contract was entitled to a joint lien on the
building and on both lots, but was not entitled to
~epa rate liens on both lot~."
and in Humphrey v Harrison Bros., U. S. Court of Appeals,
1% F. 2d 630, held where materials are furnished to a
multpilicity of houses comprised in a single project, it is not
essential to validity of lien claim that furnisher show in what
houses specific materials were used, or indeed that the materials were actually used on the project if they were purchased for and de livered to the site of the work, and such
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rule is applied whether materialman deals directly with the
owner or sells to builder who in turn contracted with the
owner to place materials in buildings. This same case held
the lien valid as against 29 houses in a 135 house project
although it was shown that plumbing supplies had not been
installed in the 29 houses liened, hut in other houses in the
project. The evidence showed all the materials were taken
to the site from time to time as needed and the bills showed
that the good~ were intended for and charged to the project.
In Miller v Laval, (Ky.) },~0 SW 2nd 376 it was held
that the intention of the parties determines whether a contract is to he treated as an entirety or as severable.
In the instant case the contractor \ras either the owner,
should the court adopt the contention of respondent, or the
agent for the owner if appellant's contention i~ adopted and
it makes no difference whether the contract is with the o\rner
or his agent in the application of our lien statute "-here the
delivery of materials is admitted and \\rhere the only question
is as to the validity and priority of the lien. In thi~ ca~e the
account of appellant is admitted by the contractor.
The only importance to the instant case \rhether re~pondent, Grow or Grow's companies or ~iecham ·was in fact
the owner of the properties liened is not on the question of
validity of the lien or it~ priority but in the application of
the bonding act should appellant ·s lien he determined to he
invalid, it having been admitted that no performance bond
was furnished as to any of the improven1ents. Neither the
trial court or this Honorable Court ruled on this point although it was pleaded by appellant and the evidence was to
tht· effect that no bond was furnished.
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It was admitted that one of Grow's companies, MidUtah Broadcasting Company, a defendant in the action,
became the owner of the Schauerhamer area properties
either during the course of construction or prior to construction of some of the houses and that Mecham was it's
contractor and that no performance bond was ever furnished.
The trial court should have found that Mecham, the
contractor, had no monies with which to purchase the LaMesa
and Rowley properties, that the monies with which those
properties were purchased came from respondent and. therefore :vr echam held title to same in trust for respondent
\\·hirh company \vas the real party in interest.
While the trial court found that Mecham acquired the
Howley and LaMesa properties for a consideration which
}lecham paid. The court did not find that Mecham was the
owner of those properties. In fact the trial court did not
make a finding as to who was in fact the owner of the properties. If appellant should concede for the purpose of argun1ent that Mecham ·was the owner of the properties mortgaged, and the lien of appellant covered properties not owned
by ;\iiecham, even if the law was as is contended by respondent, appellanfs lien would not be invalid but appellant
·would be entitled to have its lien apportioned and applied
to those lots owned by Mecham~ as was done by the Colorado
court in the Branan case cited by appellant in its original
brief at page 22, which case was based on a staute of Coloradio identical with section 38-1-3 UCA 1953 as is
pointed out in appellanfs original brief; then Mecham would
have dealt with appellant as owner-contractor and the statute
would still apply.
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In respondenfs brief in support of it's petition for rehearing it has cited at page 7 the case of W. P. Fuller v
Fisher, 217 P.53, a California case predicated on Sec. 1183
Code of Civil Procedure of California. From an examination of the case and Sec. 1183, it is apparent that the law
there provides for the furnishing of the materials with the
purpose that it be used or consumed in the work on the particular building upon which the lien is claimed and not a
delivery to the site of construction. Respondent also cites
the case of B. F. Salzer Lumber Co. a Colorado decision
which it appears is favorable to appellant, the court having
held where materials were furnished by a lumber company
and delivered to and stockpiled on a vacant lot not a part of
the property being improved, and it was contended that little
or none of the material went into the construction but that
some was used in another building being con~tructed by the
contractor for other parties and that some of the lumber ·was
sold by the contractor to other parties.
It ·was al~o urged
that the contractor ordered more lumber than 'ra~ necessary
for the building liened and that another lumber company "ras
also furnishing the same kind of lu1nher to the building.
There the court said:
"These contention~ of fact n1ust be admitted 'rith the
additional staten1ent that the lumber company did
not have kno\\"ledge that lumber for the same purpose 'ras being furnished by another company."
In the Salzar Lumber case the court cites the case of
Small v Foley~ 8 Colo. App. 444~ 17 P.67, in "chich it appeared that $;35 worth of hardware furnished by the lien
claimant was removed by the contractor and used in another
house not under the contract under which the improvements
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were being n1ade on the property liened. As to this fact the
court there said:
~~so

far
Rankin
pany.
amount

as appears, those materials were removed by
without the knowledge of the hardware comCounsel says it was error to include this
in the decree.~ .

In each of the above cases relied upon by respondent
court held in favor of the lien claimant stating that it is not
required that the materialman see that the material actually
goes into the building. In so holding the court further said
in the Salzer Lumber case:
··There is nothing in this case tending to show other
than a good faith sale by Salzer to the contractor~~
and that the· materials so sold was for use in the
Opera House building and delivered on the grounds
in the city of Ft. Collins used for the storage of
materials to be u~ed in such building. The claim of
lien ~hould be sustained."
The facts in the Whittier v Puget Sound case also cited
by respondent at page 7 are not in any degree like those of the
instant case, and in the Eisenbeis v Workman case also cited
at page 7 it appeared from claimants own testimony that he
\\'a~ furnishing brick to the contractors without any regard
a~ to \vhere they were going to use them and some of the
brick were even used in a Customs House being erected by the
contractor for the U. S. upon which the supplier could have
had no lien.
At page 9 of this same brief repsondent says with
reference to a number of cases cited by appellant in it's
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brief, which cases included the Sierra Nevada Lumber v
Whitmore and the United States Building v Midvale cases,
they were unable to find any support for appellant's position
and that the Badger Lumber case cited by appellant is direct!y to the contrary to the contention of appellant. The court
held in the Badger Lumber case where work is performed on
two separate houses the claimant cannot file a lien for the
whole amount of his lien on one house even though he attempts to approximate the amount, that a mere approximation in segregation will not suffice. Such ·was the holding
by this Honorable Court in Holbrook v Webster cited at
page 6 of appellant's original reply brief.
Respondent also states at page 7 of its brief in support
of its petition for re-hearing, there are two bases under \rhich
a materialman makes his sale to a contractor~ ( 1) on open
account with no reference on his records to any property or
project and ( 2) upon open account or specifically designated
account and require~ from the purchaser a designation of theproperty on which the materials are to be used. The evidence in the instant case is to the effect that appellant inquired of Mecham, the contractor, \rhen appellant observed
materials being removed from each stockpile and used in
houses in each area, if it should segregate its account and
Mecham said: "No it \ra~ not neressa rY. it n1ade no difference." ( R. 62).
At page 11 of respondent\~ brief in support of its motion for rehearing respondent inserts a fe"· quotes from
Mecham, the contractor'~ testimony., ,,~hich portion together
with other testimony given by Mecham is also inserted in
appellant's brief at pages 17, 18 and 19. Then respondent
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argues that for this court to apply the equitable apportion-

tionment rule based upon such evidence would make multiple
('Onstruction financing virtually impossible, and respondent
further argues that none of the authorities cited support this
application. It must he remembered that Mecham was an
adverse witness when giving his testimony, he was called
under the rules, he did not deny that materials were used in
the houses in each area of construction and taken from the
stockpiles set up by him and to which appellant was instructed to make deliveries, on the contrary he admits that all
n1aterials ordered by him from appellant were delivered by
appellant to the site and used in construction in the four areas
as houses were n1ade ready to receive plumbing materials,
( R. 579,580), therefore materials having been delivered to
the site of con~truction by appellant as ordered and directed
by the contractor and neither the contractor or the supplier
heing able to determine the amount of materials which went
into each house, under all of the authorities cited, appellant
is entitled to have it's lien equally apportioned with an
equal amount charged against each house.

CONCLUSION
_As heretofore stated., this Honorable Court having already construed the Mechanic\.; Lien laws of this state, and
appellant in reliance upon that construction having furnished
its tnaterial~ which enhanced the value of the properties,
and respondent having had a part in the manner in which
construction was carried on on the property affected by these
cases., whereas appellant acted in good faith at all times,
respondent and not appellant who is an innocent party should
suffer. The judgment should be reversed and the trial court
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should be directed to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel
as urged in appellant's original brief, or if estoppel is not
applied then to find for appellant apportioning the lien of
appellant equally as against the properties affected by the
actions.

Respectfully submitted,

M. V. Backman,
of Backman, Backman & Clark,
Attorneys for Appellant
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